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Abstract
Background: Incidental findings (IFs) and secondary findings (SFs), being results that are unrelated to the
diagnostic question, are the subject of an important debate in the practice of clinical genomic medicine.
Arguments for reporting these results or not doing so typically relate to the principles of autonomy, non-
maleficence and beneficence. However, these principles frequently conflict and are insufficient by themselves to
come to a conclusion. This study investigates empirically how ethical principles are considered when actually
reporting IFs or SFs and how value conflicts are weighed.
Methods: A qualitative focus group study has been undertaken, including a multidisciplinary group of professionals
from Belgian centres for medical genetics. The data were analysed thematically.
Results: All eight Belgian centres participated in this study. Ethical values were frequently referred to for disclosure
policies on IFs and SFs. Participants invoked respect for patient autonomy to support the disclosure of IFs and opt-
out options for IFs and SFs, non-maleficence for the professional delineation of reportable IFs and opt-out options
for IFs and SFs and (the particular scope of) beneficence for the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs, the
delineation of reportable IFs and a current decline of actively pursued SFs. Professional assumptions about patients’
genetic literacy were an important factor in the weighing of values.
Conclusions: In line with the traditional bioethical discourse, the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs might be
interpreted as a “technological, soft paternalism”. Restricting patients’ choices might be acceptable, but then its
motives should be valid and its beneficent outcomes highly plausible. Hence, the presuppositions of technological,
soft paternalism - patients’ inability to make informed decisions, normative rationality, the efficacy of beneficent
outcomes and the delineated spectrum of beneficence - should be approached critically. Moreover, distributive
justice should be considered an important value in the delineation of the current scope of the ethical debate on IFs
and SFs.
This study of guiding values may stimulate the debate on the ethical grounds for a solid policy on IFs and SFs
internationally.
Keywords: Patient autonomy, Professional beneficence, Soft paternalism, Distributive justice, Clinical genomic
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Background
In clinical exome sequencing (ES), variants in diagnostically
unrelated but known disease genes can be unintentionally
revealed or actively pursued as, respectively, incidental find-
ings (IFs) and secondary findings (SFs) [1–3]. Incidental
and secondary findings are the subject of various reporting
guidelines and policy documents, for instance in Europe,
the US and Canada [1–7]. Ethical arguments, especially
concerning autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence,
have been frequently cited for reporting these results or not
doing so [8, 9]. The study presented in this article set out to
investigate empirically how professionals consider these
and potentially other values in actual practice regarding IFs
and SFs in clinical ES.
International healthcare conventions have formalised
respect for patient autonomy in the right to receive per-
sonal and complete health information (including in-
formed consent before a medical treatment), as well as
in the right to decline medical information, treatment
and intervention [10–14].
In line with these rights, non-disclosure of clinically
relevant information has been ethically rejected and a pa-
tient’s right to be informed about (specific) IFs has been
acknowledged [8, 15]. However, whether this right also in-
stalls the professional duty to deliberately pursue add-
itional findings as SFs, is contested. The American College
of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) advocates
the opportunistic screening of a well-defined list of genes
which are clinically significant, highly penetrant (i.e. with a
high probability that the pathogenic variant will express
the associated condition) and medically actionable (i.e.
allowing medical prevention or treatment) [1]. According
to the ACMG, this pursuit of SFs is the most effective
realisation of patients’ (family-wide) wellbeing and hence
of beneficence, a professional commitment which takes a
prominent place in, for example, the Declaration of Gen-
eva [1, 5, 16]. Conversely, the European Society of Human
Genetics (ESHG), EuroGentest and the Canadian College
of Medical Geneticists (CCMG) are more cautious with
diagnostically unrelated results; they recommend a mini-
misation of IFs and they explicitly discourage or seem not
to support the active pursuit of SFs [2, 4, 6]. Arguments
for this cautiousness are the possibility of physical and/or
emotional harm (by overwhelming patients with unneces-
sary or harmful tests, diagnoses or interventions) and
hence the professional duty of non-maleficence [3, 8].
When IFs are unintentionally identified, these results
should only be disclosed if they are highly significant,
highly penetrant and medically actionable [17–19].
With respect to patients’ right not to know, there is a
consensus that explicit patient consent is required for the
screening and reporting of SFs [3, 20–22]. Since its updated
recommendations, the ACMG also agrees with a possible
patient opt-out for SFs [23]. Respecting patients’ choice on
disclosure is motivated by the idea that information about
genetic predispositions cannot be imposed because of its
possible psychological, family and social impact [24]. This
indicates that the right not to know is supported not only
by the value of patient autonomy but fundamentally
grounded in the interest of not being psychologically
harmed and hence in the professional duty of non-
maleficence [24]. Nonetheless, and despite the consensus
on an opt-out possibility for SFs, the opt-out of IFs has
been debated more intensively. Whereas some professional
bodies, such as the CCMG, strongly uphold patients’ right
not to know, the ESHG and EuroGentest recommend that
the final decision on serious and actionable IFs should be
made by professionals [2, 4, 6]. Consequently, the profes-
sional responsibilities to warn, rescue and benefit patients
might outweigh the patient’s right not to know [3].
The weighing of prima facie values such as patient au-
tonomy and professional beneficence is a classic challenge
in bioethics [25] and the debate on IFs and SFs turns out
to be a prime example of it. Consequently, opposing pol-
icies are advocated and many questions are still un-
answered. Under which conditions should a patient’s wish
to opt out of IFs be respected? If this right is not absolute,
how (for instance based on which criteria or values) can
professionals justify their decision to report these results
without patient consent? Should SFs be deliberately pur-
sued as a realisation of the professional duty of care and
the patient’s right to be informed? And more fundamen-
tally: are autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence ac-
tually guiding principles in professionals’ decisions about
disclosing IFs and SFs? Or is there a gap between theoret-
ical ethical concerns and practice [26]?
The question whether and how professionals consider
these and potentially other values as guiding notions in
the reporting of IFs and SFs in a context of diagnostic
ES in adults, is the focus of this article.
Methods
A qualitative study was organised in the eight Belgian centres
for medical genetics (CMGs) to achieve an in-depth under-
standing of professionals’ perspective on IFs and SFs. Since
the aim of this study was not to determine role-specific or
individual views but the integrated perspective of a group of
professionals who collaborate in a CMG and might decide
on the disclosure of IFs or SFs after inter-professional delib-
eration, focus groups were chosen over individual interviews
[27]. Aiming for an active debate and open conversation be-
tween colleagues, one focus group in every CMG was pur-
sued [27]. A purposive sampling approach was used in every
CMG to recruit a multidisciplinary and representative group
of professionals who are experienced with clinical ES, includ-
ing both clinical geneticists and clinical laboratory geneticists
and possibly other professionals such as genetic counsellors,
bio-informaticians or nurses [28]. Through a presentation at
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the Belgian College of Medical Genetics (a federal body for
the quality of healthcare in medical genetics), representatives
of all CMGs were informed about our study and contact in-
formation was collected from one or several professionals
(usually including the head of department) at every CMG.
Subsequently, a contact at every CMG was approached by
email or telephone by MS to provide additional information
about the focus groups and to request participation. At the
contact’s request, a preliminary consultation was organised
at several CMGs to thoroughly clarify the design and aim of
the focus group. If the contact agreed to participate, (s)he or
another professional at the CMG contacted eligible col-
leagues and assembled a representative group of people. To
counter last-minute cancellations, contacts were requested
to assemble a group of about twelve persons. When partici-
pants had been recruited, the contact suggested a time which
suited most of the CMG’s professionals.
Focus groups were conducted between November
2016 and December 2017 in a room at the CMG or as-
sociated hospital and lasted between 67 and 117 min.
The first author moderated all focus groups in Dutch or
English and participants replied in English, French or
Dutch. In seven out of eight focus groups, an observer
was present and took field notes. Informed consent was
obtained from all participants.
A semi-structured interview guide, created after a litera-
ture review and including open-ended questions, was used
for all focus groups (Table 1). At the beginning of every
focus group, the focus on IFs and SFs in clinical ES for
monogenic diseases, excluding preconception, prenatal,
screening and research contexts, was emphasised.
Focus groups were audio-recorded and transcribed
verbatim and data were saved on a password-protected
server. The data were analysed thematically [29]. The
inductive and iterative analysis process was supported by
use of the software program NVivo 12 and reflective
ideas were stored in memos. To assert the trustworthi-
ness of the data collection, analysis and reporting, an ex-
tensive procedure was elaborated, which combined peer
debriefing and a systematic audit trail [30]. TM con-
ducted a secondary analysis of a substantial subset of the
data. Consequently, TM and MS discussed transcripts
and initial code schemes, as well as theme names and
definitions. Thematic structures and draft reports were
reviewed by the multidisciplinary group of all authors
until consensus was reached between them all. Finally,
illustrative quotes were selected and, if originally in
Dutch or French, translated by MS and TM.
This article adheres to the COREQ-guidelines for
reporting qualitative research [31].
Results
All eight Belgian CMGs participated in this study, with a
total number of 68 participating professionals (Table 2).
Even though participants were not explicitly asked for
principles that supported their reporting practices regarding
IFs and SFs, professionals frequently referred to ethical
values including autonomy, non-maleficence and benefi-
cence, and these concepts emerged from the data as a spe-
cific theme. More generally, the identified themes regarded:
(i) current and general practice in clinical genetic testing,
(ii) the position of genetics in medicine and society, (iii) cri-
teria for reporting IFs, (iv) impact of IFs and SFs, (v) policy
guidelines for genetic practice, (vi) guiding values and prin-
ciples. This article specifically addresses the sixth theme in
a context of clinical ES in adults.
Patient autonomy and the right to know
Based on a patient’s right to receive relevant information,
all participants agreed on patients’ right to be informed
about some IFs. Therefore, and in the interests of a just
policy, all patients should have equal opportunities to re-
ceive relevant IFs, independent of the testing techniques
used. On the other hand, all Belgian CMGs only reported
IFs and did not actively pursue SFs (cf. infra).
Due to all CMGs’ current clinical practice of ES-based
but filtered panel testing in which a set of known
disease-associated genes is analysed, the chance of iden-
tifying an IF is not zero, but it is rather small and profes-
sionals from all CMGs reported limited experience with
IFs in clinical ES. As the significance of ever more genes
becomes known and used panels contain an increasing
number of genes or when testing techniques evolve
(and, for instance, include whole exome or whole gen-
ome analysis or genome-based panels), it is assumed that
the number of IFs will increase.
Several professionals advised that, because of the current
use of panels and to avoid unrealistic experiences, patients
Table 1 Examples of interview questions
How do you define IFs in clinical ES?
What kind of IFs do you report, firstly, from the laboratory to the
clinician and, secondly, from the clinician to the patient?
What do you think about the intentional search for SFs?
What kind of policy regarding IFs and SFs would you like to develop?
What difficulties do you experience in your practice and (future) policy
regarding IFs and SFs?
How is the possibility of IFs addressed during genetic counselling?
What might affect a patient’s interest in IFs and SFs?
What is your policy regarding a patient’s possibility to opt out of IFs?
How would you define a patient’s role in the context of IFs and SFs?
How does this role relate to your professional role?
What impact might a reported IF or SF have on patients?
To what extent do you consider a personalised policy concerning IFs
and SFs appropriate and feasible?
Abbreviations used: IF(s) Incidental finding(s); SF(s) Secondary finding(s); ES
Exome sequencing
Saelaert et al. BMC Medical Ethics            (2020) 21:9 Page 3 of 12
should be informed that, at this time, not all diagnostically
unrelated health risks will be identified. However, it was
assumed that people’s requests for genomic information
would increase over time. Consequently, many profes-
sionals stressed that, when whole exome or whole genome
sequencing becomes basic clinical testing and when it be-
comes technically feasible to comply with people’s grow-
ing requests for information, the general population
should have a better understanding of genomics and its
possible consequences and limits. Unrealistic expectations
and genetic determinism should be avoided and people
should realise that genetics cannot explain or predict all
(health) concerns.
“We have the impression that people go to the geneticist
as if they were going to a fortune teller with a crystal
ball. [After the consultation] they say “well, this is my
future”. While we say “I can’t tell you anything with a
genetic test. I don’t know if you have cancer and I don’t
know if it will come. I can’t tell you anything.” (P5, FG5).
In line with the need for better informed citizens, the
importance of genetic counselling was unanimously
emphasised. Counselling should inform patients about
the possible outcomes of the test, including IFs, in com-
prehensive, non-technical terms. Finally, new ways of
counselling were suggested, such as collective counsel-
ling sessions where general genetic concepts or frequent
conditions could be explained.
Patient autonomy and the right not to know
Participants described how ES-based panel testing (as a se-
lection of analysed genes) generally avoids the identifica-
tion of IFs, which supports the opportunity to respect a
patient’s wish not to know diagnostically unrelated results.
Participants suggested two motives for a patient’s prefer-
ence to opt out of IFs: emotional distress and diagnostic
focus. Firstly, the prospect of additional genetic informa-
tion might engender anxiety and patients might not want
to or might not feel psychologically able to deal with this
information. One professional explicitly associated a pref-
erence not to know with emotional motives, whereas a
preference to know was associated with rational motives,
for example regarding therapeutic options. Moreover, the
inherent degree of uncertainty in IFs and in genetic results
in general (because of incomplete penetrance or variable
expression, i.e. the variable manner in which a condition
is manifested) might engender feelings of doubt instead of
knowledge and assurance. Secondly, patients were de-
scribed as focussed on receiving a diagnosis for their
symptomatic condition and hence they considered IFs and
SFs less important side notes. This argument was also
stated by a professional of a CMG without an opt-out pos-
sibility for actionable IFs, but it was in line with some pro-
fessionals’ doubts regarding the centre’s current practice.
Besides these two patient motives, some professionals
explicitly referred to the fundamental value of patient au-
tonomy and the included right not to know as arguments
for unconditionally respecting a patient’s preference. Half
of the Belgian CMGs always allowed an opt-out from IFs,
including actionable results which were specified as find-
ings for which medical treatment or preventive screening
are available. Participants argued that patients cannot be
forced to receive unwanted information and that a prefer-
ence “to stay in denial” should always be respected. The
professional duty to avoid psychological harm and emo-
tional distress, potentially caused by IFs, also favoured the
possibility of an opt-out.
“When the patient says “No, I don’t want to have any
other result than what we are looking for”, then I think
you should not report it. […] Therefore, I think, genetic
counselling is very valuable and you have to do
everything to respect your patient. I think that’s the most
important thing. It’s not up to us to decide what to report
and what not […].” (P7, FG3).
Some professionals suggested that when a patient opts
out, IFs might still be reported from the laboratory to
the clinician, so clinicians can be attentive for early
symptoms during follow-up consultations. It also allows
for reporting the IF at a more suitable moment or when
the patient asks about it later. Other professionals, how-
ever, suggested that declined IFs should be masked in
the laboratory report, so situations where the clinician
knows but cannot disclose relevant information to the
patient are avoided.
Finally, participants discussed the possibility of a selective
opt-out from specific (categories of) IFs and professionals
at two CMGs (both allowing an opt-out of actionable IFs)
Table 2 Focus group participants
FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 FG5 FG6 FG7 FG8 Total
Function participants
Clinical geneticists 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 2 25
Clinical laboratory geneticists 3 3 4 2 4 2 2 6 26
Genetic counsellors/Psychologists 4 1 2 1 1 2 11
Others (Bio-informaticians, Bioethicists, MD trainees) 1 1 3 1 6
Total 6 11 9 10 8 6 9 9 68
Abbreviations used: FG Focus group
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would support this practice as soon as IFs can be accurately
categorised. However, explaining these categories might be-
come too complex, especially when the number of report-
able IFs increases. Professionals at two CMGs without an
opt-out possibility already felt that this practice was too
complicated. It would increase the professional workload
and patients were considered unable to make these strati-
fied choices.
Genetic literacy, patient autonomy and professional
beneficence
In all CMGs, a major challenge in clinical ES was discussed,
being patients’ inability to fully understand the meaning and
consequences of IFs. Participants mentioned several reasons
for people’s limited genetic literacy and inadequate under-
standing. Firstly, genetic information might be conceptually
new, complex, extensive and overwhelming. Secondly, and in
contrast to standard medical tests, IFs are usually not
expressed in related symptoms and do not reveal an “instant
reality”. This presymptomatic risk assessment with a delayed
relevance and possibly lifelong impact might be difficult to
interpret or to use as grounds for decisions. Thirdly, condi-
tions’ (incomplete or age-dependent) penetrance might be
difficult to understand, especially in unexpressed IFs, and
people might not be used to thinking about risks or chances.
Finally, genetic tests might be prescribed by non-geneticists.
Combined with a lack of time for adequate pre- or post-test
counselling, these professionals’ limited experience with gen-
etic medicine might result in an incomplete transfer of infor-
mation and “uninformed” consent from patients.
Some professionals did not believe that patients’ lack
of understanding could be resolved within the timeframe
of a counselling session and hence they did not believe it
was possible for patients to make informed decisions
about IFs. Consequently, three Belgian CMGs did not
allow an opt-out from actionable IFs. One professional
mentioned that opting out can provide temporary psy-
chological relief but eliminates neither the medical risk
nor the psychological distress in the long run. Refusing
an actionable IF is only a short-term remedy that post-
pones distress from the time of knowing to the time of
expression. Professionals at CMGs without an opt-out
possibility feared that patients did not fully understand
the potential consequences of opting out, for instance
the future benefit that might be declined. Patients might
regret it when, later, a medically actionable condition
(for example breast cancer) manifested and they might
blame professionals for non-disclosure of this risk.
“[…] I think the majority of them [patients], 99% of
them, do not know what they are agreeing to or what
they are not agreeing to, when they say “I don’t want to
know or I do want to know.”” (P8, FG3).
In addition to the argument concerning patients’ gen-
etic literacy, several professionals expressed a feeling of
responsibility towards patients. They would experience it
as psychologically unbearable and inappropriate to ob-
serve but not report a health risk of a possibly prevent-
able condition. Hence for some professionals, this
perceived duty of beneficence outweighed the value of
patient autonomy and supported the absence of an opt-
out possibility for actionable IFs. Professionals of all
CMGs debated the interaction between professional
beneficence and patient autonomy and in one CMG, this
interaction in the case of a potential opt-out was the
main point of discussion. Whereas most professionals at
this centre advocated a right not to know actionable IFs,
one professional upheld the idea of overruling an opt-
out choice and nevertheless reporting a medically
actionable IF. Arguments for this infringement of a pa-
tient’s choice were the belief that the consequences of
an unreported IF could be more severe than those of
denying a patient’s preference and, again, the belief that
patients do not understand the possible consequences of
their own opt-out choice.
“For something like a BRCA1-deletion […], I would not
accept an opt-out and I would inform the patient
anyway, saying “well, the consequences are so big, so
important, [that] I consider it medically more important
that you know, than actually to respect your autonomy
as a patient.” (P8, FG3).
In defence of a mandatory disclosure of actionable IFs,
few patients were said to dispute this policy, which sug-
gested patients’ trust in the professional practice. It also
supported a participant’s statement that a mandatory
disclosure should not be qualified as a paternalistic act
but as acting in line with patients’ interests and with
their need for guidance along the diagnostic quest.
Even though adequate understanding for autonomous
decision-making was not considered possible by everyone,
genetic counselling was generally estimated essential and
effective to prepare patients for a potential (mandatory)
disclosure of IFs.
“You can compare it to a pregnancy ultrasound. Why do
families or mothers want a pregnancy ultrasound? To hear
that everything is okay. Very few people think about the
possibility of bad news and how to deal with it. And I think,
when people enter the [genetic] centre, this is one of our
essential tasks. […]. So if you incidentally find a [variant in
a] Lynch-gene [included in a breast cancer panel], you can
say something like “look, this is not the answer, but we have
found something else of importance.” It is an essential part
of our job that, at that time, this [information] is not
completely new to patients.” (P7, FG2).
Professionals also acknowledged individual variance in
the capacity to understand or emotionally bear genetic
information. Personalising the policy on IFs (for example
by offering some patients more options) was, however,
regarded as undesirable because it violates the value of
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equality and stimulates favouritism and a dual healthcare
system. Moreover, offering personalised options entails
the difficulty for professionals of estimating a patient’s
situation and capacities correctly.
It should be noted that at two of three CMGs without an
opt-out possibility, professionals did not only rely on ethical
arguments but also referred to procedures prescribed by
the local ethics committee. Participants mentioned that the
ethics committee did not allow an opt-out because it
assigned professionals the responsibility of reporting avail-
able and useful information and because it considered pa-
tients incapable of informed decision-making in the context
of clinical ES. Remarkably, some professionals at these
CMGs said that if the ethics committee were updated on
recent evolutions in clinical ES, a re-evaluation of the opt-
out policy might be possible. However, no in-house consen-
sus was reached on this idea.
As a final remark, several professionals stated that, de-
pending on the patient’s best interests (including a cor-
rect diagnosis), a patient’s genetic illiteracy is no reason
to dismiss a genetic test in se. Even after counselling, nu-
merous patients will not fully realise the meaning and
possible consequences of ES (including the possibility of
IFs). However, the test would usually be performed any-
way, as this was considered to benefit a patient’s care.
“I try my best to explain it, but when I notice, at a
certain moment, that it [a patient’s understanding] stops,
but they want another child, then I think, also for the
best interest of the patient, let’s just start another test.
[…] Doing nothing, because you think they have not fully
understood, while you think it is in their interest to
continue, well, then I think, as a clinician: “What would
be the best choice of several options?” (P10, FG4).
The scope of ethical values
The last theme applies to the scope of ethical values and
their application in practice. This theme was clearly ob-
served in three particular issues concerning the disclos-
ure of diagnostically unrelated findings.
Firstly, despite patients’ right to be informed about IFs,
this right was limited by professionals’ duty of non-
maleficence. There was a consensus among professionals
at all CMGs to specifically delineate the scope of report-
able IFs. Most participants advocated a restriction of re-
portable IFs to class 5 and class 4 (pathogenic and likely
pathogenic) variants in medically actionable genes, but
several professionals indicated that this spectrum might
change when scientific knowledge increases or societal
interests and taboos change. Only one professional men-
tioned that the professional delineation of reportable IFs
could be perceived as “rather paternalistic”. Conversely,
at more than half of the CMGs, participants stated that
their professional expertise should compensate for pa-
tients’ genetic illiteracy and that it is their professional
responsibility to decide which findings are comprehen-
sible for lay people and hence relevant to report. More-
over, reporting “ambiguous” or “nonsensical” data (for
instance class 3 variants of uncertain significance (VUS)
or medically non-actionable IFs) might result in harmful
interventions, (unnecessary) fear or false feelings of cer-
tainty, and professionals assigned themselves the duty of
avoiding these possible harms.
“Professional bodies have decided that it’s about the
actionables. Hence only cancer and cardiac conditions
have been included [in lists of reportable results]. I think,
if you include more, it will become very stratified and
one might wonder whether patients still understand what
they are signing up for.” (P11, FG2).
“Different systems are being used and some [genetic]
centres say “let’s offer different choices to the patient” and
this can go very far. Patients can choose not only whether
they want to receive [additional results] or not but also
which [additional results] they want to receive. […] I have
even seen an [informed consent] form which asked whether
you want to receive variants of non-significance or not. So
where the idea is something like “in the laboratory, we can’t
figure it out, so let’s leave it up to the patient.” (P1, FG2).
In the delineation of reportable IFs, some professionals
considered the health of patients’ family members as in-
cluded in the duty of beneficence and hence they sup-
ported the disclosure of IFs regarding a carrier status of
a recessive condition.
“When patients find out, during a later pregnancy, that
their child has Duchenne [muscular dystrophy] although
we have seen it in their older daughter… You don’t want
this to happen. That’s why we don’t work with an opt-
out, to avoid this kind of thing.” (P2, FG2).
Secondly, the scope of professional beneficence was
sometimes delineated by the spectrum of the “clinical
gaze”. Some professionals characterised medical respon-
sibilities as not strictly limited to the diagnostic question,
which resulted in a more extended perspective of a pa-
tient’s health. Mainly professionals at two CMGs without
an opt-out possibility for actionable IFs advocated this
holistic clinical gaze.
“It also creates a responsibility, I think, when a patient
consults you for a condition and there is also something
else in the family which might be important, that you have
to keep this in mind and do something about it. We have
had such a discussion, about someone who consulted us for
cancer while there was also a history of aneurysms in the
family. This was not followed up and the patient died of
an aorta aneurysm. Afterwards, it was discussed whether
it was the counsellor’s responsibility to follow up on this.”
(P9, FG4).
Other participants, however, defined their fundamental
responsibility as more restricted. Patients were charac-
terised as diagnostically focussed and aiming for a specific
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answer to a particular question. To address this request
and to answer patients’ questions most efficiently, profes-
sionals should adopt this diagnostically focussed clinical
gaze. Hence, these professionals supported the use of spe-
cific, demand-driven tests that minimise the chance of
additional findings.
“I think that we, clinicians, should try to avoid finding
IFs as much as possible and so we should use as many
filters as possible to avoid them.” (P3, FG5).
Finally, and associated with the scope of beneficence, sev-
eral participants mentioned and showed enthusiasm for a
future practice of SFs (described as a practice of opportun-
istic screening with a presymptomatic risk disclosure). This
possibility was mentioned by professionals at both CMGs
with and without an opt-out possibility for IFs and it was
presented as a practice that could meet patients’ increasing
demand for genomic information and a practice that could
achieve a higher level of care. Some professionals even
feared that denying a practice of SFs could someday be la-
belled a medical error. However, there was a consensus
among professionals at all Belgian CMGs not to routinely
pursue SFs yet and to consider this practice as currently
falling outside the scope of beneficence. Various underlying
reasons were mentioned for this limited scope. Firstly, a
practice of SFs might be a disproportionate investment of
limited budgetary, logistical, human and technical re-
sources. Combined with a lack of specific guidelines, this
could result in less valid and potentially harmful results and
it would disadvantage a CMG’s workflow and lengthen the
waiting time for diagnostic results. Secondly, and partly due
to lay people’s genetic illiteracy, society was not considered
ready for a routine practice of SFs. Finally, it was suggested
that patients fundamentally do not want to receive add-
itional results (whether IFs or SFs) because of the intrinsic
“bad news” they include. Even though IFs or SFs might be
useful, no patient wants to be confronted with additional
health risks. Therefore, there was an agreement among pro-
fessionals on patients’ future right to opt out of SFs. This
right was also stressed by professionals of CMGs without
an opt-out possibility for actionable IFs.
“You cannot offer a kind of package deal and say “we
are going to do this test and you are also obliged to
accept these SFs […].” That is something you can’t do, it
would be unethical.” (P1, FG7).
The fundamental restraint towards additional “bad
news” did not only apply to patients. At two CMGs, par-
ticipants expressed the professional feeling of emotional
distress caused by IFs. Neither patients nor professionals
are looking for IFs and a confrontation with these find-
ings is unpleasant to both parties. Hence reporting IFs
was characterised as “a dirty job” that still needs to be
done; finding the balance between autonomy, benefi-
cence and non-maleficence was experienced as “mental
gymnastics” for professionals.
“Most people don’t really want to know [this information]
anyway, but I think, if you find it, they should know. But
it’s… I try not to get in that situation, if possible […] If I ask
for a cardiomyopathy, I don’t want to find BRCA mutations,
I don’t want to find a mental retardation mutation! […] as
a medical person, as a doctor, I feel that I have to do it, but
still, if I were the patient, I wouldn’t be pleased to find out. I
would rather know, but I wouldn’t be pleased about it.” (P8,
FG3).
Discussion
Professionals at Belgian CMGs frequently justified their
centre’s practice and policy regarding IFs and SFs by
ethical principles. As a consequence of the use of ES-
based panel testing and a limited experience with IFs in
clinical ES, it should be acknowledged that these justifi-
cations might not only consider actual practices but also
preferable future policies.
In line with international scholarly literature, professionals
frequently referred to principles of autonomy, non-
maleficence and beneficence [8]. The disclosure of IFs was
supported by respect for patient autonomy, the professional
delineation of reportable IFs was supported by non-
maleficence and the spectrum of beneficence, and the deci-
sion not to actively pursue SFs was supported by the
currently limited scope of beneficence. The possibility of opt-
ing out of actionable IFs was the most discussed element
during the focus groups and various ethical values regarding
this practice were weighed up. Allowing an opt-out was justi-
fied by the values of autonomy (respecting a preference not
to know) and non-maleficence (not inflicting psychological
or medical harm), whereas not allowing an opt-out was
mainly justified by the principle of beneficence (preventing
future medical harm as a duty of care). The weighting of
these values was strongly influenced by professional ideas
about patients’ genetic literacy, their (inadequate) under-
standing of ES and IFs and their ability to make informed
and autonomous decisions. These assumptions affected pro-
fessionals’ final choice regarding an opt-out possibility and
resulted in mandatory reporting of actionable IFs at some
Belgian CMGs. Mandatorily reporting of IFs, irrespective of
patients’ preferences, might sound contestable in current,
patient-centred ideologies, but it is supported by recommen-
dations by the ESHG and EuroGentest, which advocate a
professional final decision regarding the disclosure of serious
and actionable IFs [2, 4]. Conversely, the policy of half of the
Belgian CMGs that allow an opt-out from IFs is supported
by Vears et al.’s points to consider for laboratories and by
the CCMG position statement which states that “competent
adults should be given the option prior to testing to receive
(or not receive) incidental findings unrelated to the primary
test indication.” [6, 7].
If the reporting of IFs occurs against a patient’s con-
sent, this disclosure might be conceptualised as medical
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paternalism, i.e. interference in a patient’s autonomy with-
out this patient’s consent, but only because the medical
professional is genuinely concerned about patients’ health
and wellbeing and thinks that his/her interference will
benefit the patient [32–35]. Since the professional’s action
consists of an epistemic intervention - the disclosure of
medical information which is considered useful - the
mandatory reporting of actionable IFs can also be labelled
as “epistemic paternalism” [36, 37].
In line with traditional bioethical discourse, the mandatory
disclosure of actionable IFs at three Belgian CMGs would be
considered soft paternalism because patients are assumed to
lack the genetic literacy to fully understand the consequences
and impact of ES and IFs and hence, in this context, they are
unable to make informed, autonomous decisions [25, 38, 39].
Soft paternalism is not uncontested but accepted by many as
a common medical intervention and is, on occasion, also pre-
ferred by patients themselves [25, 40]. In addition to the pre-
vious conceptualisation, we will refer to the mandatory
reporting of actionable IFs as technological soft paternalism.
In comparison to other medical information that patients
might understand, ES technology and the abundant and com-
plex results it might generate (including IFs) are, also after
standard pre-test counselling, considered very complex for
the average patient [34, 41]. Hence the medical technology
used is the specific and context-dependent cause of patients’
inadequate understanding and inability to make autonomous
decisions, and it is the underlying technological justification
of soft paternalism.
In summary, the technological, soft paternalism re-
garding actionable IFs can be characterised as the pro-
fessional decision, motivated by patients’ best interests,
to disclose actionable IFs because patients lack the gen-
etic literacy to understand the technology of ES and its
complex results and hence are, in this context, incapable
of autonomous decisions.
Despite the technological, soft paternalism’s grounds
in undeniably complex medical information and its ben-
evolent focus on patients’ wellbeing, some remarks can
be made regarding its justification and efficacy in the
specific context of clinical ES and actionable IFs.
Firstly, as the soft paternalism is grounded in the spe-
cific context of ES technology and its complex results, the
mandatory reporting of actionable IFs might be consid-
ered a modus of “procedural paternalism”: only in the spe-
cific context of genetic testing by means of ES technology
and at the specific time of diagnostic testing are patients
incompetent and non-autonomous and hence profes-
sionals are authorised to decide on the disclosure of re-
sults without patients’ consent [39], However, it is hard to
claim that, even in this specific technological context,
every patient lacks the genetic literacy to understand com-
plex ES results, and hence is incompetent to decide au-
tonomously about the disclosure of these results. It seems
that exceptions to technological, soft and procedural pa-
ternalism should be allowed but it is unclear how these
exceptions are compatible with the principle of justice.
These reflections were also expressed by professionals
from some Belgian CMGs and in participants’ restraint
concerning more personalised choices regarding IFs be-
cause of their possible violation of the justice principle.
Technological, soft paternalism could also be considered a
type of “endangerment paternalism”, where actions are
generally subjected to paternalistic actions because of the
risk that at least some people are incompetent [39]. How-
ever, this would imply that some patients are limited in
their actions without actual proof of their inadequate un-
derstanding, turning the paternalistic intervention into
hard paternalism towards autonomous persons [39].
Moreover, autonomous decisions about IFs might not re-
quire a full and technological understanding of ES and in-
stead, autonomy and genetic literacy might be considered
a continuum. Rather than an absolute ideal, autonomy
can be considered a threshold concept where patients
have a sufficient understanding and are sufficiently compe-
tent and autonomous [36, 39]. It is also likely that this un-
derstanding should not focus on the technology of ES, but
rather on comprehensible and practical consequences of
test results, an idea which was, along with the suggestion
about new ways of counselling, also raised by Belgian pro-
fessionals [3, 42, 43]. The possibility or at least the pursuit
of a sufficiently informed and autonomous patient does,
however, not deny professionals’ more profound under-
standing of ES and genomic results, and this expert epi-
stemic position applies generally in medicine [25].
Moreover, the complexity of ES results is generally ac-
knowledged and literature has shown that the genetic lit-
eracy of the general population is rather limited [44, 45].
Hence doubts about patients’ ability to make informed de-
cisions about IFs, even after pre-test counselling, are not
uniquely Belgian concerns [17, 46]. In conclusion, rather
than aiming for a fully informed patient decision-making,
the issue of IFs might be agreed upon by a dynamic
process of shared decision-making in which both the pa-
tient and professional participate actively [33]. This idea
aligns with the suggestion that counselling and consent
should not focus strictly on information provision and pa-
tients’ individual, rational and autonomous decisions, but
should pursue a relational autonomy where patients and
professionals reach a decision collaboratively [47]. In such
a relational decision-making process, respect for auton-
omy and beneficence might be expressed in such a way
that both values can be respected [48].
Secondly, the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs was
partly supported by the assumption that an autonomous
patient would agree with disclosure. This suggests that a
preference to know is the rational preference because it is
well-informed. This idea was also expressed by a Belgian
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professional who considered a desire to know to be a ra-
tionally grounded choice, whereas a desire not to know
was usually considered emotionally grounded. However,
the association between wanting to know and rationality
on the one hand, and not wanting to know and emotion
on the other hand, could be challenged. Various emotional
reasons are possible for wanting to know IFs, for instance
a fearful desire to control life as much as possible. Con-
versely, as also suggested by professionals who support an
opt-out and might value non-maleficence (and autonomy)
over beneficence, knowledge can be emotionally disturb-
ing and the rational control over one’s life can necessitate
some degree of ignorance [35].
“Rationality sovereignty” [39], which supports the norma-
tive standard of wanting to know, is related to the well-
known argument of incoherence, which states that ignorance
inherently conflicts with autonomy and that autonomous in-
dividuals who want to make informed decisions cannot ig-
nore relevant medical information [14, 36]. Likewise, Harris
has advocated that patients should be “rational choosers”
who base their decisions on “an appropriate level of informa-
tion” [49]. Whether the argument of incoherence is true or
not, it does not apply to the mandatory reporting of IFs. If
patients need to be competent and autonomous, they need
to be informed about the process of testing, the procedure of
ES and its possible consequences, including IFs, before test-
ing and not afterwards about actual IFs. The claim that being
adequately informed requires the mandatory reporting of IFs
confounds the prerequisites of an autonomous decision (i.e.
being adequately informed about the genetic testing proced-
ure and possible results) and its possible consequences (i.e.
being informed about identified IFs). The only way to valid-
ate this claim is to state that ignorance about actionable IFs
can impede future autonomous decisions about one’s health
and life. However, as stated above, receiving IFs does not ab-
solutely guarantee an enhanced rationality or, as explained
below, a better medical and/or psychological outcome.
A last remark should be made on some professionals’
claim that few patients dispute the mandatory reporting of
actionable IFs. A central clause of medical paternalism
concerns the act of going against patients’ preferences
[33]. If most patients seem to value the return of action-
able IFs positively, it might be questioned whether the
mandatory reporting can actually be classified as a pater-
nalistic intervention. Sandman and Munthe have stated
that decisions and interventions are paternalistic whenever
they ignore patients’ perspectives, even if they do not ex-
plicitly go against patients’ preferences [33]. Even if pa-
tients retrospectively approve of professional decisions,
their autonomy is partly undermined by being denied
some control over the decision-making process [33].
Moreover, this retrospective approval might be the effect
of a psychological coping strategy to accept information
one cannot unlearn. Nevertheless, from a consequentialist
point of view, which also supports paternalism and its
beneficent outcomes in general, it might be upheld that
the (moral) harm of mandatorily reported IFs is decreased
by patients’ retrospective approval of the paternalistic and
epistemic intervention.
The mandatory reporting of IFs may certainly result in
effective prevention or early treatment of disease. How-
ever, it might be questioned whether the soft paternal-
ism regarding actionable IFs is absolutely effective. A
minimum requirement for paternalism to be justified is
that its benefits outweigh its risks [25]. This claim
echoes the screening criteria of Wilson and Jungner and
the American Medical Association (AMA) Principles of
Medical Ethics, which state that genetic testing is most
opportune when it will meaningfully affect a patient’s
care [13, 50]. Hence it should be demonstrated that
mandatorily reporting actionable IFs will benefit a pa-
tient’s health, a claim which is, however, contested
sometimes. Knoppers has warned for the “overpromis-
ing” of genetic data and, more generally, the pathogen-
icity, penetrance and expression of variants in
asymptomatic persons have been disputed [51]. IFs may
vary in reliability and possible use and it should be rea-
lised that reporting misinterpreted or uncertain findings
might result in unnecessary or harmful follow-ups or in-
terventions [35, 37, 52–55]. Moreover, IFs might cause
changes in family, social and professional structures, con-
siderable financial costs, problems regarding insurance or,
as already mentioned, emotional harm [35, 36]. For Bel-
gian professionals who support an opt-out possibility, the
values of non-maleficence and patient autonomy might
take precedence over professional beneficence because of
these possible negative consequences of reported IFs. For
professionals who reject an opt-out possibility, these po-
tential consequences are, per contra, not considered suffi-
cient reasons to outweigh the professional duty of
beneficence. If, however, the advantages of reported IFs
were surpassed by (possibly underestimated) negative con-
sequences, then the mandatory reporting of IFs invalidates
the benefit that paternalism is supposed to provide and vi-
olates the professional duty of non-maleficence [55].
This introduces a last topic: the scope of values and,
more specifically, the delineation of a patient’s best inter-
est and of a professional’s responsibility and beneficence.
Firstly, this topic was reflected in discussions on report-
able IFs. Should only results which might benefit a patient’s
medical interest be disclosed? Or should a medical profes-
sional also consider results for a patient’s psychological and
personal benefit or for the health of his/her family mem-
bers? Some Belgian professionals referred to a family-wide
concept of medical beneficence when arguing for a possible
disclosure of IFs regarding a carrier status of a recessive
condition, an idea for which international support has in-
creased [7, 56]. Bullock’s context-sensitive evaluation of
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patients’ best interest further broadens the concept by stat-
ing that the disclosure of medical information should be
guided by an evaluation of patients’ physical health, their
short- and long-term psychological wellbeing and respect
for and the facilitation of their (future) autonomy [36]. The
delineation of a patient’s best interest is related to the de-
bate on IFs’ actionability and the question of whether these
genomic findings should only enable medical interventions
or also personally valuable actions, a topic which we have
discussed elsewhere [57].
Secondly, questions about the delineation of beneficence
were reflected in professionals’ divergent ideas on the
spectrum of the professional “clinical gaze”. Whereas
some (especially people working in CMGs without an opt-
out possibility) advocated a more holistic clinical gaze that
is not strictly bound by the diagnostic question, others
defended a professional diagnostic focus, in line with pa-
tients’ core interest. However, and irrespective of partici-
pants’ perspective on the clinical gaze or opting out of IFs,
no one has currently recommended the deliberate pursuit
of SFs. Belgian professionals showed that they were well-
acquainted with the ACMG recommendations on SFs and
sometimes they (implicitly) referred to these recommen-
dations to explain or justify their CMG’s policy on IFs. An
example concerned a participant’s delineation of the
spectrum of reportable IFs (“Professional bodies have de-
cided that it’s about the actionables. Hence, only cancer
and cardiac conditions have been included.” P11, FG 2).
This echo of recommendations on SFs in the discourse
about IFs might be partially caused by a limited experience
with IFs in clinical ES but it also illustrates these recom-
mendations’ international impact. The intertwinement be-
tween the discourse about IFs and the one about SFs can
also be discerned in laboratory points to consider, where
it is stated that “[i]f a variant on the ACMG list is identi-
fied as UF [unsolicited finding] then it should be re-
ported.” [7]. Despite this echoing of recommendations on
SFs, there was a consensus among professionals from Bel-
gian CMGs that the active pursuit of SFs currently ex-
ceeds the spectrum of beneficence. Underlying arguments
were society’s unpreparedness for this practice (an idea as-
sociated with genetic illiteracy) and people’s fundamental
unwillingness to hear bad news (an idea associated with
the duty of non-maleficence). However, these problems
could be countered by initiatives that increase people’s
genetic literacy and by an absolute opt-out possibility for
SFs. Hence the most fundamental argument for the de-
cline of a practice of SFs might be professionals’ statement
that this practice is currently an unjust allocation of lim-
ited resources. Even though some Belgian professionals
were enthusiastic about potentially achieving a “higher
level of care” through SFs, this practice was considered
currently unfeasible and hence inappropriate. This opin-
ion tallies with the AMA principle that specific care can
be denied when it compromises the provision of more
fundamental care and with the ethical acknowledgement
of a limited professional duty of beneficence because of
limited resources and distributive justice [13, 25]. In this
sense, Belgian professionals’ perspective conflicts with
ACMG members’ evaluation of screening for SFs as stand-
ard medical practice and with the suggestion that if diag-
nostically unrelated information is that valuable, its
discovery should not be left to coincidence but actively
pursued [1, 5, 52, 58]. Justice, as argued by this last state-
ment, should not be achieved by withholding the oppor-
tunity of SFs from patients but by guaranteeing equal
access to these results for all patients [52].
In Belgian CMGs, the current lack of resources and the
principle of distributive justice may not only justify the
current decision not to actively pursue SFs but also the
nationwide use of ES-based panel testing (as both prac-
tices limit the amount of analysed genes and hence of re-
quired resources). This limitation of possible results
(including IFs) is supported by international professionals’
questioning of the return and pursuit of IFs and SFs as the
most efficient use of limited resources [17, 55, 59, 60]. A
filtered analysis minimises (but cannot completely avoid)
the chance of IFs and most of the time it is most efficient
in terms of diagnostic clinical relevance, it avoids an infor-
mation overload and it allows clinicians to maximally real-
ise their clinical task [59]. Hence, it is within the
boundaries of this panel of available results that concepts
of reportable results, opt-out and mandatory disclosure
should be considered. It also implies that even the profes-
sional duty of geneticists who assign themselves the re-
sponsibility of a more holistic clinical gaze is still bound
and delineated by the scope of the genetic panel. In other
words: for reasons of beneficence, the clinical gaze and the
spectrum of professional duty might exceed the diagnostic
question but currently, for reasons of distributive justice,
this duty does not exceed the scope of the diagnostic
panel. Ultimately, this suggests that the value of distribu-
tive justice profoundly delineates the scope in which
values of autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence are
currently debated. An increase in available resources, de-
creasing costs of clinical ES-based testing or evolutions in
scientific knowledge, societal preferences or people’s gen-
etic literacy may (but not necessarily should) affect the im-
pact of distributive justice, the spectrum of reportable
results and the weighing of values in an ethical disclosure
policy on IFs and SFs.
Conclusions
Professionals at Belgian CMGs frequently refer to ethical
values for disclosure policies on IFs and SFs. Respect for
patient autonomy is invoked to support the disclosure of
IFs and opt-out options, non-maleficence to support the
delineation of reportable IFs and opt-out options and (the
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scope of) beneficence to support a mandatory reporting of
actionable IFs, the delineation of reportable IFs and a
current decline of actively pursued SFs. Additionally, the
value of distributive justice largely delineates the scope of
reportable results and the spectrum in which ethical
values are currently debated. Over the coming years, the
spectrum of the ethical debate on IFs and SFs might
change and initiatives to improve people’s genetic literacy
might affect the legitimacy of a restriction in patient
choices on disclosure. Soft paternalism may be acceptable,
but the validity of its motives and the plausibility of its
beneficent outcome should be continuously verified in the
context of scientific, economic and societal evolutions.
This study does not address all aspects of IFs and SFs
which require ethical reflection. Topics concerning the
informing of family members about IFs, the notification
of patients when new information on IFs is available and
the implications of patients’ choices for the use of (elec-
tronic) health records or patient portals are not included
in the scope of this article but definitely require further
research. The results of this study emerge from a Belgian
context with its specific healthcare structure. However,
the way values are weighed in the context of IFs and SFs
might be familiar to or instructive for other countries.
Therefore, a more international and collective debate on
the ethical grounds for a solid (future) policy on IFs and
SFs might be highly valuable.
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